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FOUCAULT ON HISTORY 
AND THE SELF 
Real Fillion 
Department of philosophy 
University of Moncton 
RÉSUMÉ : Les derniers ouvrages de Michel Foucault nous aident à comprendre comment l'his-
toire, telle qu'il la pratiquait, conduit à une forme de connaissance de soi critique qui promet 
une certaine liberté. On discute ici des deux derniers volumes de son Histoire de la sexualité 
du point de vue de sa philosophie de l'histoire. 
ABSTRACT : Michel Foucault's last works help us to understand how history, as practised by him, 
leads to a form of critical self-knowledge that promises a certain freedom. The last two vol-
umes of his History of Sexuality are discussed here in terms of his philosophy of history. 
I. FOUCAULT AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 
A lthough the change of tone and subject-matter of Michel Foucault's last two volumes of his History of Sexuality1 has caused much discussion and reconsid-
eration of his work as a whole,2 what has been little discussed is the way these works 
shed light on Foucault's conception of the relation between ourselves and history, 
and between the past and the present. More specifically, I would like to argue in this 
paper that these last works help us understand how history, as practised by Michel 
Foucault, leads to a form of critical self-knowledge that promises a certain freedom. 
In other words, I would like to discuss these last works in terms of Foucault's phi-
losophy of history. 
It is important to try and understand Foucault's work as a philosophy of history, 
not only to forestall a persistent but misguided criticism, but also to enable us to 
evaluate the true significance of his contribution both to history and philosophy. The 
1. Michel FOUCAULT, Histoire de la sexualité, t. 2, L'Usage des plaisirs, Paris, Gallimard, 1984 (The Use of 
Pleasure, translated by R. Hurley, New York, Pantheon, 1985). Hereafter, referred to as UP ; and ID., 
Histoire de la sexualité, t. 3, Le Souci de soi, Paris, Gallimard, 1984 (The Care of the Self, translated by 
R. Hurley, New York, Pantheon, 1986). Hereafter referred to as CS. 
2. The debate is often characterized in terms of whether or not there is a "return of the subject" in these 
works. What is meant by the phrase is whether or not Foucault is finally recognizing that, in order for his 
analysis to be effective, he cannot rid himself of the concept of a grounding subjectivity, in the Kantian 
sense of a condition for the possibility of experience. Cf. Luc FERRY and Alain RENAUT, La Pensée 68 : 
Essai sur l'anti-humanisme contemporain, Paris, Gallimard, 1988, p. 178-195 ; and more recently, Alain 
TOURAINE, Critique de la modernité, Paris, Fayard, 1992, p. 193ff. 
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most general and widespread criticism of Foucault is that his work, although clearly 
evaluative in its unmasking of incipient forms of modern power (or so the story goes) 
does not in itself provide the normative framework that would justify and ground 
such evaluations. Indeed, not only do we encounter this objection in critics like Tay-
lor, Habermas, Merquior, Grumley, Dews,3 but also in such sympathetic readers as 
Dreyfus and Rabinow. On the last page of their important study on Foucault, they 
write : 
It might seem that if Foucault wants to give up one set of dangers for another, he owes us a 
criterion of what makes one kind of danger more dangerous than another. Foucault is clear 
that he cannot justify his preference for some dangers over others by an appeal to human 
nature, our tradition, or universal reason. His silence on this matter, while consistent, is 
nonetheless a source of conclusion.4 
However, the confusion here does not stem from Foucault's work as such, but 
from certain assumptions about the function of philosophy. To say that Foucault 
"owes us" criteria and must "justify" his preferences presupposes a view of philo-
sophical activity as precisely that : the formulation and articulation of criteria and 
justifications for evaluating between "good" and "bad" and "true" and "false." 
Clearly, Foucault, insofar as he wishes to continue Nietzsche's project, rejects such a 
view of philosophy ; but, more importantly, he rejects it in terms of and by means of 
his historiographical practice. His well-known rejection of any teleological, subject-
centered conception of history is not only (and I would argue not primarily) a theo-
retical challenge to a particular philosophical tradition (stemming from German Ide-
alism), but, more significantly, it is a practical challenge to the predominant way in 
which philosophers and historians of ideas conceive and practice history. By doing 
this, Foucault is virtually alone amongst contemporary philosophers of history in 
following through on his rejection of speculative philosophy of history (à la Kant and 
Hegel) by not attempting a theoretical justification of those criteria of significance 
that would render history intelligible ; but, rather, like the new historians (who also 
from a backdrop to his work),5 he seeks to explore and articulate the actual operation 
of various criteria of significance and selection already hard at work in the variety of 
processes that configure both the past and the present. (Criteria especially evident — 
or made so with the help of Foucault's analyses — in our prisons, asylums, and am-
biguous attitudes towards sex.) 
3. Jurgen HABERMAS, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, translated by F.G. Lawrence, Cambridge, 
MIT Press, 1987 ; Charles TAYLOR, "Foucault on Freedom and Truth," in Philosophy and The Human 
Sciences, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (coll. "Philosophical Papers," 2), 1985 ; José G. 
MERQUIOR, Foucault, London, Fontana, 1985 ; John E. GRUMLEY, History and Totality : Radical His-
toricismfrom Hegel to Foucault, London, Routledge, 1989 ; Peter DEWS, Logics of Disintegration : Post-
Structuralist Thought and the Claims of Critical Theory, London, New York, Verso, 1987. 
4. Hubert L. DREYFUS, Paul RABINOW, Michel Foucault : Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, Chi-
cago, University of Chicago Press, 19832, p. 264. 
5. The historian Paul VEYNE (admittedly Foucault's friend) writes : "Foucault, c'est l'historien achevé, 
l'achèvement de l'histoire" ("Foucault révolutionne l'histoire," in Comment on écrit l'histoire, Paris, 
Seuil, 1978, p. 203) ; and perhaps a little less dramatically, Jacques LE GOFF, another important French 
historian has this to say of Foucault whom he regards as "un grand intellectuel contemporain qui est à la 
fois un grand historien et un grand philosophe et a joué un rôle de premier plan dans le renouvellement de 
l'histoire [...] {Histoire et Mémoire, Paris, Gallimard, 1988, p. 258). 
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In addition — and this is the concern of this paper — Foucault draws out the 
philosophical implications of such a practice (and concomitant conception) of his-
tory. If criteria of significance, indeed of intelligibility itself, are historically consti-
tuted, and if history itself is best described in terms of a variety of different processes 
whose configurations depend on the questions they allow to be asked, then the pic-
ture of history as a process of ever-increasing rationality or increased self-
consciousness (presupposed by the demand for criteria of significance) cannot remain 
unquestionable or unquestioned. Indeed, even the rather innocuous idea that more 
historical knowledge can only lead to better self-awareness becomes problematic 
when history becomes a question of the various knowledges that have been produced, 
the kinds of awareness they promote, right down to the very selves that are thereby 
constituted. 
Which brings us to the last two volumes of the History of Sexuality. What I 
would like to do through an examination of these two texts is to show how the ulti-
mate function of Foucault's historical analysis is to provide us with a critical self-
knowledge (of ourselves and the present) that I call self-wariness (as opposed to self-
awareness, the principal concern of traditional philosophy of history). Rather than a 
substantive self-knowledge, his type of historical analysis can be seen as providing a 
critical self-knowledge, a knowledge that can show the different ways our "selves" 
may be constituted and constructed. As Foucault has said : "Among the cultural in-
ventions of mankind there is a treasury of devices, techniques, ideas, procedures, and 
so on, that cannot exactly be reactivated, but at least constitute, or help to constitute, 
a certain point of view which can be very useful as a tool for analyzing what's going 
on now — and to change it."6 
Thus, this idea of self-wariness leads not only to a critical self-knowledge but 
also to action, not by prescribing any particular course, but by pointing out possibili-
ties. Here, too, Foucault's understanding of history challenges the more traditional 
conception that sees its task as that of discerning the necessary conditions of that 
which it investigates. The problem with this approach is that that which is investi-
gated must already be defined and in some sense complete. However, as Foucault as 
well as the new historians have shown, there is nothing in history that can serve as 
such a non-contingent object of investigation (everything is open to re-interpretation 
and therefore is not complete) ; therefore, rather than seek necessary conditions, Fou-
cault's histories spell out conditions of possibility. And by pointing out the possibility 
of various configurations, one thereby implies the possibility of other possibilities ; 
and it is in these possibilities that a modest but very real sense of freedom can be 
found and practiced. Or so I claim a close reading of Foucault reveals. 
II. DE-FAMILIARIZING THE PRESENT 
Why, in his last works, did Foucault turn to Antiquity ? This is the question that 
most commentators ask when confronted with the last two volumes of the History of 
6. H.L. DREYFUS, P. RABINOW, op. cit., p. 236. 
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Sexuality.1 Foucault had occasion to respond to this question in various interviews,8 
but perhaps the most pertinent response for our purposes is to be found in The Use of 
Pleasure where he writes : 
After all, what would be the value for the passion for knowledge if it resulted only in a 
certain amount of knowledgeableness and not, in one way or another and to the extent pos-
sible, in the knower's straying afield from himself ? There are times in life when the ques-
tion of knowing if one can think differently than one thinks, and perceive differently than 
one sees, is absolutely necessary if one is to go on looking and reflecting at all (UP, 8). 
This is an important statement ; indeed, in a sense, it provides a key to under-
standing this "turning" to the Greek experience of ethics. The point to note is that it is 
the experience of ethics that is of interest to Foucault and not principally the fact that 
it is of Greek and Roman origin.9 In fact, then, objections such as that put forward by 
Daraki that Foucault misrepresents the Greeks,10 or again that he overestimates the 
value of Greek "freedom,"11 or even yet that he undervalues a potential Greek 
"feminism"12 within that experience of ethics, are in some sense beside the point. 
And they are beside the point because they misunderstand the particular use Foucault 
is making of history. He does not turn to ancient history in order to find a pre-modern 
normative foundation. Indeed, as we saw above, he does not see the philosophical use 
of history to be one of establishing criteria and justifying norms. Foucault under-
stands philosophy as an activity and not as the elaboration of a doctrine or theoretical 
construct. This is the reason why his philosophical questions have consistently been 
connected to historical research ; that is, his histories do not merely serve as illustra-
tions of his "theory." As he himself puts it : 
There is always something ludicrous in philosophical discourse when it tries, from the out-
side, to dictate to others, to tell them where their truth is and how to find it, or when it 
works up a case against them in the language of naive positivity. But it is entitled to ex-
plore what might be changed, in its own thought, through the practice of a knowledge that 
is foreign to it (UP, 9). 
7. This is specially true in France. Aside from the works mentioned above, see also Mario VEGETTI, 
"Foucault et les anciens," Critique, 471-472 (août-septembre 1986), p. 925-932 ; Maria DARAKI, "Le 
voyage en Grèce de Michel Foucault," Esprit, 100 (avril 1985), p. 55-83 ; Henri JOLY, "Retour aux 
Grecs : réflexions sur les 'pratiques de soi' dans L'Usage des plaisirs" Le Débat, 41 (septembre-
novembre 1986), p. 100-120. 
8. Probably the most cited is the interview conducted by Dreyfus and Rabinow published as an Afterword to 
their work on Foucault and entitled "On the Genealogy of Ethics". Cf. also "An Aesthetics of Existence," 
"The Return of Morality" and "The Concern for Truth," all interviews reprinted in Michel FOUCAULT, 
Politics, Philosophy, Culture : Interviews and Other Writings, 1977-1984, New York, Routledge, 1988 ; 
as well as "The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom," in Bernauer and Rasmussen, éd., The 
Final Foucault, Boston, MIT Press, 1988, p. 1-20. 
9. Of course, the choice is not arbitrary either. The point is that it provides an important perspective on our 
contemporary experience of ethics. As he explains in "The Return to Morality :" "Trying to rethink the 
Greeks today does not consist in setting off Greek morality as the domain of morality par excellence 
which one would need for self-reflection. The point is rather to see to it that European thinking can take 
up Greek thinking again as an experience which took place once and with regard to which one can be 
completely free" (p. 249). 
10. M. DARAKI, art. cit., p. 72. 
11. M. VEGETTI, art. cit., p. 928. 
12. H. JOLY, art. cit., p. 113. 
146 
FOUCAULT ON HISTORY AND THE SELF 
Thus the appeal to history ; it takes us away from our all-too-familiar world ; as 
well as providing a perspective on that world. He insists, however, that although he is 
clearly "doing" history in these works, they are not to be considered the works of an 
"historian," by which he means that their primary task is not to tell us something 
about the past, although they remain keen to the latest historiographical develop-
ments.13 In other words, these works are clearly works of historical research but they 
are presented philosophically, from philosophical motives. Foucault calls them a 
philosophical exercise whose "object was to learn to what extent the effort to think 
one's own history can free thought from what it silently thinks, and so enable it to 
think differently" (UP, 9). 
While this may help us understand why Foucault consistently attaches his philo-
sophical questions to historical ones, it still does not tell us why Foucault now chose 
the Greeks and Romans. Is Foucault — a professor at the College de France for some 
time now — simply paying his dues and returning to the canon ? Foucault, whose 
work until then had consistently restricted itself to a certain periodisation of history 
(Renaissance, Classical Age, Modern Age), insists that by distancing himself form 
this periodisation he was able to get a better perspective on what he had consistently 
been trying to do (which he now characterizes as a "history of truth"), that is : 
"analyzing, not behaviors, or ideas, nor societies and their 'ideologies,' but the prob-
lematizations through which being offers itself to be, necessarily, thought — and the 
practices on the basis of which these problematizations are formed" (UP, 11). This 
analysis of problematizations is what Foucault means by genealogy, or what he also 
characterizes as 'historical ontology,'14 and it is important to remember that geneal-
ogy, for Foucault, "means that I begin my analysis from a question posed in the pres-
ent."15 He writes : 
[...] in raising this very general question, and in directing it to Greek and Greco-Roman 
culture, it occurred to me that this problematization was linked to a group of practices that 
have been of unquestionable importance in our societies : I am referring to what can be 
called the "arts of existence." What I mean by the phrase are those intentional and volun-
tary actions by which men not only set themselves rules of conduct, but also seek to trans-
form themselves in their singular being, and to make their life into an œuvre that carries 
certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria. These "arts of existence," these 
"techniques of the self," no doubt lost some of their importance and autonomy when they 
were assimilated into the exercise of priestly power in early Christianity, and later, into 
educative, medical, and psychological types of practices. Still, I thought that the long his-
tory of these aesthetics of existence and these technologies of the self remained to be done, 
or resumed (UP, 10-11). 
13. The importance of Foucault vis-à-vis the idea of history is summed up by Le Goff when he says that what 
Foucault offers is "une philosophie originale de l'histoire étroitement liée à la pratique et à la méthodolo-
gie de la discipline historique" (J. LE GOFF, op. cit., p. 296). 
14. "On the Genealogy of Ethics." It is here that he gives a description of genealogy as "historical ontology" 
in general and the History of Sexuality in particular as "an historical ontology in relation to ethics through 
which we constitute ourselves as moral agents" (p. 237). 
15. Michel FOUCAULT, "The Concern for Truth," p. 262. Put in these terms, the question posed in the present 
for these works is why the lifting of sexual prohibitions does not resolve the question of ethics. Cf. ibid., 
p. 263. 
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It is clear from this passage that the concern with the concept of an "art of exis-
tence" is the main goal of the proposed history, but not because Foucault wishes to 
retrieve an ancient practice, nor is his history meant to describe, as Dreyfus and 
Rabinow put it, "an attractive and plausible alternative." Foucault explains : 
I am not looking for an alternative ; you can't find the solution of a problem in the solution 
of another problem raised at another moment by other people. You see, what I want to do 
is not the history of solutions, and that's why I don't accept the word "alternative." I 
would like to do genealogy of problems, or problématiques. My point is not that every-
thing is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same thing as bad. 
If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not 
to apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic activism.16 
Here we see again how what I have called the idea of wariness is connected to 
the idea of history. The kinds of history Foucault writes help keep us on our guard, 
keen to the dangers of seductive solutions and unspecified promises which we nor-
mally and unthinkingly accept as valid, self-evident, or matter of course. The self-
wariness he promotes through his histories is an awareness of a self that is not "the 
source of self-assertion and exclusion but the target of a questioning through which 
people might start to depart from the historical limits of their identifications, talking 
their particularities as so many historical specificities."17 In other words, its prescrip-
tivism is primarily negative and connected to the political character Foucault empha-
sized in his earlier work. That is, the ethical considerations of the last two volumes of 
the History of Sexuality are intimately linked to the political concerns of the first vol-
ume, inasmuch as they are directed, as James W. Bernauer has pointed out, to "an ef-
fort to get at a form of becoming a subject that would furnish the source of an effec-
tive resistance to a specific and widespread type of power."18 This is done, through 
the study of history, by producing "a de-familiarization of the 'desiring man' who lies 
at the root of our willingness to identify with the form of individual subjectivity con-
stituted for us in the modern period."19 In other words, the point and purpose of his-
tory is to enable us to become self-wary in such a way that the identities "we" (as 
identified) recognize are loosened such that "we" (considered anonymously) can 
grasp them for "our-selves" autonomously and independently. But we are getting 
ahead of ourselves. 
16. H.L. DREYFUS, P. RABINOW, op. cit., p. 231-232. 
17. John RAJCHMAN, Truth and Eros : Foucault, Lacan, and the Question of Ethics, New York, Routledge, 
1991, p. 108. This is essential reading for a proper appreciation of Foucault's later work. John Rajchman 
has also written probably the best brief overview of Foucault's work in his Michel Foucault, The Free-
dom of Philosophy, New York, Columbia University Press, 1985. 
18. James William BERNAUER, Michel Foucault's Force of Flight, Atlantic Highlands, Humanity Press, 
1990, p. 166. Bernauer's book is essential for understanding Foucault's philosophical contribution, as 
opposed to reading him exclusively in terms of social and political theorizing. 
19. Ibid. 
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III. FROM SELF-MASTERY TO CREATIVITY 
First, I would like to examine how Foucault effects this "de-familiarization" in 
The Use of Pleasure. Note that this is something that must be done because otherwise 
what happens is that most histories simply read backwards from the present in order 
to classify the experience they set out to recount. Here Foucault is consistently using 
the methods present in the earlier works of not looking for "precursor" ideas but 
looking instead at the formulation of different problems.20 However, by going back 
all the way to the Greeks, Foucault is not only seeking to trace the genealogy of the 
configurations of relations that continue to have a hold on us. He is not merely trying 
to identify them. He wants in effect to allow us the opportunity to "disengage" our-
selves from them. This is the purpose of "de-familiarization." And in many ways it 
resembles the play of continuity and discontinuity that characterizes his earlier work. 
However, the continuity/discontinuity distinction is not here meant to characterize the 
historical process but rather to characterize the understanding of the self 
Thus Foucault turns to the Greeks, who have pride of place in our culture's self-
understanding and yet whose practices are in so many ways unfamiliar ; especially 
those practices revolving around sex. The point is, unfamiliarity also presupposes 
familiarity and, as it turns out, Foucault is intent to focus as well on the continuities 
surrounding the self-understanding of sexual practices between the Greco-Roman 
world and the Christian world. Note that Foucault is interested in the self-
understanding that define those practices and not the practices themselves which, it 
has long been observed, differ substantially both from those of the early Christians as 
well as those considered acceptable today. However, just to note some of the major 
points of difference between pagan sexual practices and Christian ones : they usually 
revolve around such notions as the nature of the sexual act, where it is connected to 
sin and the Fall for Christians and given positive connotations for the pagans ; other 
practices revolve around notions of monogamy and fidelity, as well as chastity. And 
finally, of course, the acceptance and even valorisation of homosexuality in the pagan 
world is often contrasted with the (until recently) unconditional exclusion of it in 
Christianity. The general character of these comparisons usually leads to the conclu-
sion that while Christianity seems obsessively concerned with sexual practices, the 
Greeks appear to be largely indifferent. 
However, Foucault argues that this appearance of indifference stems from the 
fact that sexual practices for the Greeks were neither codified nor monitored in the 
same way that such practices were to be within Christianity. They were nevertheless 
discussed, and evoked similar concerns. For example, monogamy and fidelity were 
encouraged because there was a fear that unreproductive sex had negative effects on 
a given individual {i.e. involves "spending" too much of one's vital energy). As well, 
homosexual practices were of course accepted, but the image of the effeminate and 
flaccid male was also current and carried with it clear negative connotations. And, fi-
20. For this aspect of Foucault's historiographical methodology and its indebtedness to Gaston Bachelard and 
Georges Canguilhem, cf. Gary GUTTING, Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Reason, Cam-
bridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989. 
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nally, there was a clear valorisation of sexual abstention (one need only think of Soc-
rates) and its connection with the achievement of truth and wisdom. Thus, we see 
here important continuities between the attitudes towards certain sexual practices. 
So much for continuity and familiarity. What is so different (i.e. discontinuous 
and unfamiliar) about the Greek attitudes towards these sexual practices is that they 
are not presented as a set or rules for the relation between the sexes but are rather "an 
elaboration of masculine conduct carried out from the viewpoint of men in order to 
give form to their behaviors" (UP, 22-23). And, furthermore, this elaboration does 
not take the form of a set of prohibitions or interdictions but rather as, for the indi-
vidual male, a "stylization of an activity in the exercise of its power and the practice 
of its liberty" (UP, 23). Here, the purpose for studying the Greeks becomes excep-
tionally clear inasmuch as the effect of de-familiarization reaches its peak. And yet, 
again, such a de-familiarization contains within it an element of familiarity (other-
wise it would no be described as unfamiliar, but as incomprehensible or unrecogniz-
able) in that the problematization of sexual practices in connection with this notion of 
"stylisation" is describable in terms of an individual's personal freedom, autonomy, 
and self-mastery ; notions definitely familiar to "our" self-understanding. 
The concept that holds together the twin poles of familiarity and unfamiliarity, 
continuity and discontinuity, is that of problematization. The interest in the problem-
atization of sexual practices for Foucault is that it opens up a new conceptual dimen-
sion of moral or ethical reflection and activity. While morality and ethics usually in-
volve discussion concerning codes and conduct, Foucault's problematizing approach 
brings out a third dimension which he calls the self-constitution of the subject vis-à-
vis these codes and the conduct required of them. That is, this third dimension in-
volves the individual's choosing to conduct himself according to the prescriptions of 
the code. In other words, within any given code, and within the conduct it prescribes, 
"there are different ways to 'conduct oneself morally, different ways for the acting 
individual to operate, not just as an agent, but as an ethical subject of this action" 
(UP, 26). Thus, one might say, there is an internalization effected between the code 
and the conduct, and this internalization is what one would call the "moral subject." 
The moral subject is thus something constituted. 
An individual is not merely related to the — in this case "moral" — world (via 
codes) but also to himself, and this is not simply in terms of self-awareness, but in a 
practical and constitutive sense. Or, as Foucault puts it, there is no particular moral 
action "that does not refer to a unified moral conduct ; no moral conduct that does not 
call for the forming of oneself as an ethical subject ; and no forming of the ethical 
subject without 'modes of subjectivation' and an 'ascetics' or 'practices of the self 
that support them" (UP, 28). And Foucault of course sets as his task the examination 
of this third dimension of "practices of the self found in Antiquity surrounding the 
problematization of pleasure, desire, and sex. 
Rather than go in great exegetical detail — I refer the reader directly to the text 
for Foucault's legendary rhetoric is at a minimum and his clarity is exceptional — I 
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would simply like to draw out the major features of this "art of existence" Foucault is 
describing and connect it with the goal of what I have been calling "self-wariness." 
Sex is a problem for the Greeks, but not the sexual act in itself. That is, the sexual 
act is not classified in any particular way and details about it are not normally dis-
cussed. One might say that sexual acts are a matter for concern but : "when they were 
the subject for questioning, what was at issue was not the form they assumed, it was 
the activity they manifested. Their dynamics was much more important than their 
morphology" (UP, 42). 
There is, within Greek sexual activity, a general unity between act, desire, and 
pleasure (a unity which, Foucault notes, Christianity will dissociate). That is, the 
Greeks were not confronted with the problem between the desire for sex, the sexual 
act itself, and the pleasure one gets from it (it is not a matter of lack and satisfaction). 
What we have instead is the problem of force. That is, it is a question of the force (of 
nature) that unites the three terms. The problem of sexual activity (and not the act 
considered in itself) concerns the dynamics of the triad act-pleasure-desire, which it-
self is analyzed in terms of two variables : 1) quantity, or more precisely, intensity 
(homosexuality, for example, is not so much abnormal or unnatural as it is exces-
sive) ; 2) the role or polarity, i.e. the positioning, of the free adult male (women, 
slaves, and boys were considered as objects, not as partners, and therefore moral con-
cern was not extended to them). 
Immorality, then (for men, since this morality is for and by men), revolves 
around the notions of excess and passivity. The sexual act, being natural, is valued ; 
but it remains a matter of moral concern because it is, like all natural things, a force 
and a force that must be controlled. The question becomes : how is this control to be 
effected ? Nor from above, nor from without, but from within. What Foucault calls 
the "use" {usage, chrësis) of pleasure has to do, not with what is permitted or forbid-
den, but rather with what is a matter "of prudence, of reflection, and calculation in 
the way one distributed and controlled his acts" (UP, 54). The moral criteria involved 
in the use of pleasure cannot be codified or tabulated beforehand but is a matter of an 
individual's assessment of his need, an opportune moment, as well as regard for that 
individual's status. This is not to say there are no general laws that the individual 
must also take into account. The laws of nature and the city and indeed of religion 
cannot be disregarded. However, they serve as the context, or background, of the ac-
tions of a particular individual, and not as a code or a model to be adopted. Foucault 
writes : 
The few great common laws — of the city, religion, nature — remained present, but it was 
as if they traced a very wide circle in the distance, inside of which practical thought had to 
define what could rightfully be done. And for this there was no need of anything resem-
bling a text that would have the force of law, but rather, of a technë or "practice," a savoir-
faire that by taking general principles into account would guide action in its time, accord-
ing to its context, and in view of its ends. Therefore, in this form of morality, the individ-
ual did not make himself into an ethical subject by universalizing the principles that in-
formed his action ; on the contrary, he did so by means of an attitude and a quest that 
individualized his action, modulated it, and perhaps even gave him a special brilliance by 
virtue of the rational and deliberate structure his action manifested (UP, 62). 
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In this important passage we see how Foucault plays off the familiar with the un-
familiar. He describes a context in which moral or ethical conduct is individualized in 
a way that is alien to the present's universalizing approach to morality ; namely that 
that morality has an historical dimension which in effect relativizes its universalizing 
pretensions. Thus, an individualized and individualizing approach becomes intelligi-
ble and perhaps even desirable ; but even more importantly, it renders such a concep-
tion possible. 
But this does not mean that Foucault thinks that the Greek approach is a solution 
to present concerns. As we have seen, he explicitly denies this on the simple grounds 
that the problems of the present cannot be resolved by using the solutions of the past. 
(If history teaches us anything, it teaches us that.) But that does not mean the past 
therefore has nothing to offer the present. On the contrary, because the past has pro-
vided solutions to its problems, and to the extent that its problems share certain simi-
larities with present ones (and they must, otherwise we would be unable to recognize 
them as problems), what the past has to offer is perspective, a vantage point from 
which to view the present's "self-entanglements," that is, the way the "self is pres-
ently constituted. 
The present's view of the self is entangled with notions of freedom, autonomy, 
and truth. The Greek experience of sex — the subject of Foucault's history — reveals 
another self entangled in related notions of freedom, self-mastery, and truth. His first 
volume showed how, in trying to untangle the knot tying together the notions of free-
dom, autonomy, and truth (the knot might be called "the repressive hypothesis") the 
knot was only tightened further (talk leading to talk and only talk). Thus, rather than 
getting entangled further, Foucault turns to past knots which he can untangle because 
he is not completely tied to them. The knot freedom-autonomy-truth is not the same 
knot as freedom-self-mastery-truth. The latter he can and does untangle. And he does 
so, as mentioned above, by examining the "use of pleasure" divided in the triple dis-
tinction of desire-pleasure-act. The virtuous "use of pleasure" in Greek experience 
does not involve the proper ordering or balancing or the triple distinction. The virtue 
needed for the proper ethical "use of pleasure" revolves around the notion of self-
mastery, which is connected to the notion of freedom, not in the sense of the former 
leading to the latter, but in the sense of the one being constituted by the other. That is, 
self-mastery is necessary in order to be and remain free. Freedom is here understood 
as "a certain form of relationship of the individual with himself (UP, 92). The oppo-
site of freedom on this view is not a natural determinism or a divine will but a kind of 
slavery ; the opposite of self-mastery would be self-enslavement (esclavage de soi 
par soi). This freedom then is not a freedom from all constraints (the kind of freedom 
called for by the repressive hypothesis, i.e. a "liberating" freedom) but "a power that 
one brought to bear on oneself in the power that one exercised over others" (UP, 93). 
As well, in this ethical perspective, self-mastery is also constitutive of truth inasmuch 
as the truth of the self is not seen as the elucidation and revelation of inner desire, but 
rather is conceived constitutively as the "mode of being of the moderate subject" (UP, 
89 ; my emphasis). Thus, the goal or ideal of such an ethical perspective is as fol-
lows : "The individual fulfilled himself as an ethical subject by shaping a precisely 
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measured conduct that was plainly visible to all and deserving to be long remem-
bered" (UP, 91). One might say that this ethical perspective of the self — as opposed 
to being the inner truth that must be universalized in theory as is the case in the pres-
ent — must be constitutively externalized in practice in order truly to be a self, i.e. in 
order to be free and autonomous. This is what Foucault calls the "aesthetics of exis-
tence" characteristic of the Greek experience. 
Historically specific and thus capable of being untangled, Foucault shows how 
the knot of Greek experience has at least one string tied to the present, namely "that 
some of the main principles of our ethics have been related at a certain moment to an 
aesthetics of existence"21 ; and that the possibility thus exists for an ethics based on 
an individual's creating a work of art out of his or her life. Thus, rather than propos-
ing a return to the Greek triad of freedom-self-mastery-truth, Foucault seems to be 
arguing for a new triad one might describe as freedom-creafc'W/v-truth. This would be 
a new "aesthetics of existence" where one's life is to be one's work of art. It is within 
this creative possibility that a new relation between freedom and truth resides. 
Note that Foucault is arguing for a creative life and not a creative self as in, for 
example, the radical freedom of the existentialist self. Foucault is careful to distin-
guish himself from a view such as Sartre's : 
From the idea that the self is not given to us, I think that there is only one practical conse-
quence : we have to create ourselves as works of art. In his analyses of Baudelaire, Flau-
bert, etc., it is interesting to see that Sartre refers the work of creation to a certain relation 
to oneself — the author to himself — which has the form of authenticity or inauthenticity. 
I would like to say exactly the contrary : we should not have to refer the creative activity 
of somebody to the kind of relation he has to himself, but should relate the kind of relation 
one has to oneself to creative activity.22 
And thus the need for the particular kind of historical analysis Foucault offers. It 
shows the different (creative) ways individuals have been related to themselves, 
thereby removing the necessity of current predominant ones. While all of this is 
rather upbeat and positive, the removal of the sense of necessity does not by itself 
remove the effective constitutive relations individuals have to themselves. Foucault is 
pointing to a possibility not a reality. The reality is that most individuals are bound 
and tied to particular "selves" that leave little room for creativity. This is because 
most individuals do not see their "selves" (or more precisely, their lives) as a creative 
activity, but as something to be uncovered, discovered, recovered, and ultimately 
obeyed. This is the sense of self Foucault is combating, the idea that one's life should 
be devoted to discovering one's true self. These are the selves Foucault is wary of 
(thus the need for and function of self-wariness rather than self-awareness). History 
shows that these selves are many, demanding of the individual things like submis-
sion, obedience, or renunciation. Amongst these possibilities, there is one to which 
Foucault pays particular attention in his last work ; it is a self that calls for careful 
concern, and it is this concern for self that I would like to consider next. 
21. H.L. DREYFUS, P. RABINOW, op. cit., p. 236. 
22. Ibid., p. 237. 
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IV. FRAGILE IDENTITIES 
To recapitulate : the self is constituted. This is the fundamental claim of the last 
two volumes of the History of Sexuality. The self is not given, it is constituted 
through a set of practices within a given historical context. The self is thus an histori-
cal object, subject to change and transformation. Historical analysis and research en-
ables us to identify those practices constitutive of different kinds of selves, and does 
not therefore provide the self with an identity (as some would have history do). 
The point that Foucault is making is that the self is not the product of a particular 
activity in the sense that the product can be detached from the activity ; the self is the 
activity. The self is constituted by a set of practices but it is not those practices ; 
rather it resides in the way those practices are taken up. But taken up by whom ? The 
answer is : by particular individuals. 
In order to be clear about this point, I would like to introduce an idea suggested 
by my reading of much contemporary historiography and its efforts to distinguish it-
self from sociology (inasmuch as sociology is much more "theory-driven" than his-
tory is). The idea is that of the anonymous individual. This is the term I give to all 
those individual human beings who people the historical process and are the subject-
matter of historical reconstructions and yet remain unnamed. That is, they are the in-
dividuals that historians refer to when they speak of peasants and warriors, or doc-
tors, teachers and lawyers, vagabonds and bandits. The idea of an anonymous indi-
vidual is an historical concept, and not a sociological one, inasmuch as the primary 
reference is to the actual flesh and blood individuals who were peasants, doctors, 
criminals, etc. Put another way, although the subject-matter of both these disciplines 
may be the same — the activities of these people — the reference is not. For sociol-
ogy, the reference is to the function and role of the activities themselves ; for history, 
the reference is to the (past) lives of human individuals. Sociology has as its goal the 
explanation of human behaviour ; history the task of describing past human lives. 
The results of sociological investigations are destined for various administrative and 
governmental uses ; historical investigations are undertaken with the view of achiev-
ing a particular kind of "self-knowledge." 
I would like to use this concept of the anonymous individual in order to distin-
guish between the concrete {i.e. bodily) individual human being and his or her self.23 
The attempt to distinguish them is not meant to say that there are individuals out 
there who are not also selves, or selves that are not individuals. Rather, the distinction 
is to help us understand the different elements involved in the way human beings re-
late, not only to the world and others, but to themselves as well. Indeed, the distinc-
tion I am trying to make is implicit in the very expression : one's relation to oneself. 
The "one" here refers to the individual considered anonymously related to that same 
individual considered as a specifiable self with specifiable characteristics. And the 
23. One might want to say that the distinction is simply between the social, cultural, symbolic properties of 
human beings as opposed to their physical and biological ones. However, since this is a problem of his-
torical reference, appeals to biology and physics are not really helpful. The distinction is not between the 
physical and mental but between real and hypothetical or ideal. 
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relation is one of "identity" when there is no conflict or gap between the individual 
considered anonymously and the individual considered as a particular self. That is, 
the self is complete, such that the individual totally identifies with it and does not 
distinguish himself from that self. However, more often than not, and perhaps today 
more than in the past, an individual can distinguish himself from that self and con-
sider himself "anonymously" i.e. independently of the different roles and functions 
he is "said" to have and which make up his sense of self. And to the extent that he 
can do this, then the relation he has to himself is no longer one of identity but instead 
becomes problematic and a matter for concern. 
Which brings us to the third volume of Foucault's history of sexuality, Le Souci 
de soi, usually translated as The Care of the Self. The use of the terms "care" to 
translate "souci" is to a certain extent quite appropriate given that the work does deal 
with medical texts devoted to what today we would characterize as "health care." 
However, souci also can be translated by worry and concern, as in having concerns 
or worries about some matter. 
Both senses are reflected in Foucault's work inasmuch as an increasing concern 
for self displayed in late Antiquity — that is, concern for what was seen as the self's 
"fragility" — led to the preoccupation (another word for souci) by doctors and mor-
alists in their writings to develop a careful practice of examination and care for one's 
self. This care and concern found expression in the writings of those doctors and 
moralists explicitly concerned with sexual matters and what they thought was a sign 
of the "immorality and dissolute ways" (CS, 39) of their society. However, what is 
interesting and remarkable (and directly relevant to the present's concerns) is that : 
[...] this desire for rigor expressed by the moralists did not take the form of a demand for 
intervention on the part of public authority. One would not find in the writings of the phi-
losophers any proposal for a general and coercive legislation of sexual behaviors. They 
urge individuals to be more austere if they wish to lead a life different from that of "the 
throngs" ; they do not try to determine which measures or punishments might constrain 
everyone in a uniform manner (CS, 40). 
We see here again the anti-universalist thrust of Foucault's analysis. He considers 
these writings of the moralists and philosophers of late Antiquity and their call for 
austerity precisely because they are not proposing a blueprint of model to be applied 
or constructed ; it is rather addressed to individuals. Foucault is aware that this appeal 
to individuals is often seen as reflecting the more general weakening of the social and 
political structures characteristic of late Antiquity. Unstable periods are characteristi-
cally said to give rise to this kind of "individualism" where people retreat into their 
private lives where things can more readily appear under control. 
However, this kind of "explanation" is historically suspect. Lumping together 
different phenomena under the rubric "the rise of individualism" serves only to ob-
scure matters that need to be carefully distinguished. The term "individualism" can 
describe what Foucault calls different "realities." He distinguishes and describes 
three of these : 
Three things in fact need to be distinguished here : 1) the individualistic attitude, charac-
terized by the absolute value attributed to the individual in his singularity and by the de-
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gree of independence conceded to him vis-à-vis the group to which he belongs and the in-
stitutions to which he is answerable ; 2) the positive valuation of private life, that is, the 
importance granted to family relationships, to the forms of domestic activity, and to the 
domain of patrimonial interests ; 3) the intensity of the relations to self, that is, of the 
forms in which one is called upon to take oneself as an object of knowledge and a field of 
action, so as to transform, correct, and purify oneself, and find salvation (CS, 42). 
Note that Foucault calls what he is describing here different "attitudes." This of 
course is connected with the kind of "ethics" we discussed in the last section that 
dealt not with codes and practices principally but with the way in which codes were 
understood and practices undertaken. The same applies here. He acknowledges im-
mediately that these different "attitudes" need not be mutually exclusive ; although 
different periods in history can be seen as characterized by the predominance of one 
or the other. For examples, he uses ancient warrior societies as exemplifying the 
first ; nineteenth century bourgeois society the second ; and certain early Christian 
ascetic movements as typical of the third. 
The point of making these distinctions is to show that the period he is describing, 
while obviously fitting in a general way with the third "attitude" described above, 
displays a specific kind of "individualism" — if one can even call it that — which 
revolves around the general idea of a "culture de soi.'" Foucault argues that this idea 
reaches far back in Greek culture and is characterized by the general principle that 
one should take care of oneself {prendre soin de soi-même). One finds it in Xeno-
phon, Plutarch (when discussing the Spartans), and of course in Plato's Socrates. It is 
the guiding principle of what Foucault calls the "art of existence " of the period he is 
describing, and in the course of its development it had taken on a very general sense 
which Foucault summarizes as follows : 
[...] the principle of care of oneself became rather general in scope. The precept according 
to which one must give attention to oneself was in any case an imperative that circulated 
among a number of different doctrines. It also took the form of an attitude, a mode of be-
haviour ; it became instilled in ways of living ; it evolved into procedures, practices, and 
formulas that people reflected on, developed, perfected, and taught. It thus came to con-
stitute a social practice, giving rise to relationships between individuals, to exchanges and 
communications, and at times event to institutions. And it gave rise, finally, to a certain 
mode of knowledge, and to the elaboration of a science [savoir] (CS, 45). 
Thus, if one still wants to call this "care or concern for the self and individual-
ism, then it is certainly not the kind of individualism characterized by autonomy and 
independence as in the first model ; nor by the retreat into privacy typical of the sec-
ond ; nor even is it properly applied to the third model of purification and salvation. 
If we describe these "individualisms" as the relation one (considered anonymously) 
has with oneself, then the first identifies the self with the will, the second with the 
private enjoyment of one's possessions, and the third with one's purified soul. As 
distinct from these, Foucault describes a relation with oneself as the care one gives to 
a fragile and vulnerable body in need of constant attention. In other words, it is 
something that takes a great deal of time and effort. The point of considering the self 
as a fragile body emphasizes that the relation with the self is not something that is 
sought after as a goal, or an end, as a prize, or discovery, but is rather a continuous 
156 
FOUCAULT ON HISTORY AND THE SELF 
process. It is not the culmination or point or object of all other activities but relates to 
the way those activities are undertaken ; it is not the focal point but the center of 
those activities. The concern for self should be seen principally as "a change of ac-
tivity : not that one must cease all other forms of occupation and devote oneself en-
tirely and exclusively to oneself ; but in the activities that one ought to engage in, one 
had best keep in mind that the chief objective one should set for oneself is to be 
sought within oneself, in the relation of oneself to oneself" (CS, 64-65). 
The interest of this relation to self is that, while still connected to the ethics of 
self-mastery, there is what Foucault calls an "infléchissement" a bending, a slight 
change of direction or accent. What we have at this point is a unique situation where 
the self is poised, as it were, between a complete immersion and identification within 
given practices and an abstract universalism. The sexual morality promulgated by 
doctors and philosophers testifies to this in that it continues to demand "that the indi-
vidual conform to a certain art of living which defines the aesthetic and ethical crite-
ria of existence" on the one hand, but on the other "this art refers more and more to 
universal principles of nature or reason, which everyone must observe in the same 
way, whatever their social status" (CS, 67). This shift towards universal appeals does 
in effect dislocate the self from its embeddedness (like a bone dislocated from its 
socket) without, however, abandoning the individual body, as it were (that is, the per-
son acting out her life at a particular time and place — we are still within the ambit of 
an "aesthetics of existence"). Here we see more clearly the point and purpose of Fou-
cault's advocacy of the cogency of such an "aesthetics of existence." It is a mode of 
existence that is free from the unquestioned habit of local practices as well as résis-
tent to the call to universal norms and rules directed for and directed by what Ber-
nauer calls "a science of life" in the sense that characterizing "human existence as a 
work of art is to remove it from the domain of the scientifically knowable and free us 
from the obligation of de ciphering ourselves as a system of timeless functions that 
are subject to corresponding norms."24 Putting it in these terms is of course showing 
the interest the "aesthetics of existence" has for the present ; it is clearly not what 
best describes the Greek experience. Once again, Foucault is attempting to set up a 
picture that is at once familiar and unfamiliar, continuous and discontinuous. 
The Care of the Self is devoted to the historical analysis of this new attitude to-
wards the self which has the individual poised between concrete identification and 
universal appeal. Probably the best example he gives of this dislocation from embed-
ded practices or relating oneself to oneself is most evident in what Foucault calls the 
"political game," that is, in political practices. He argues that the dismantling of the 
City-States and the growth of Empire is not best described in terms of a decline of 
civic life and political elites and a retreat or withdrawal into self. The important point 
is that the extension of the Empire required changes in "the conditions of the exercise 
of power" (CS, 83) in the sense that the administrative reach had to be adjusted to a 
widened Empire. Thus what we see is not the decline and decadence of a civic elite, 
but rather we are confronted with "the search for a new way of conceiving the rela-
24. J.W. BERNAUER, op. cit., p. 182. 
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tionship that one ought to have with one's status, one's functions, one's activities, 
and one's obligations" (CS, 84). In other words, the new political realities required a 
different understanding of oneself as a political actor. Given the wider circumstances 
(and unfamiliar ones) in which "one" had to act politically, "one" became more 
acutely aware of the outward signs of function and role (uniform, habits, gestures) 
and, concomitantly, one became increasingly aware and concerned with that which 
was not connected to these functions and roles. Or, to put it another way, one became 
increasingly aware of, and concerned with, the nature of one's relation (as an individ-
ual considered anonymously) to these roles and functions. And once this step is 
taken, then the whole relation one has with oneself is rendered problematic. Indeed, 
the attitude one has towards one's own acts becomes problematic. That is, one's 
status and position no longer dictate what "one" is to do. That status may be respon-
sible for the general outline of one's situation, but it is the individual who is respon-
sible for the actions "one" undertakes. Put in terms of political action, the individual 
exercising power "has to place himself in field of complex relations where he occu-
pies a transition point. His status may have placed him there ; it is not his status, 
however, that determined the rules to follow and the limits to observe" (CS, 88). 
Again, it is important to note that in describing this particular relation to self 
Foucault is not proposing an ideal to be adopted or even emulated. This would be to 
miss the point of historical analysis. What he is doing is describing a historical possi-
bility that does not find its raison d'être in what came before nor in what followed. It 
is the familiarity and the unfamiliarity of the period in question and are not meant to 
subsume it into a uniform and linear process. The Care of the Self, like most of Fou-
cault's work, is set up precisely to make the contras evident. He contrasts the "culture 
de soi" of late Antiquity with the earlier model of self-mastery discussed in The Use 
of Pleasure. He also makes frequent references to the future relation to self charac-
teristic of early Christianity (the subject-matter of the unpublished Les Aveux de la 
chair) in order to contrast it with the period in question. In his conclusions to The 
Care of the Self he takes up the themes discussed in detail in the book and empha-
sizes the continuity and discontinuity of the period in question. He writes : 
A certain style of sexual conduct is thus suggested by this whole movement of moral, 
medical, and philosophical reflection. It is different from the style that had been delineated 
in the fourth century, but it is also different from the one that will be found in Christianity. 
Here sexual activity is linked to evil by its form and its effects, but in itself and substan-
tially, it is not an evil. It finds its natural fulfillment in marriage, but — with certain ex-
ceptions — marriage is not an express, indispensable condition for it to cease being an 
evil. It has trouble finding its place in the love of boys, but the latter is not therefore con-
demned as being contrary to nature (CS, 239). 
The interest of Foucault's work, then, is the way it describes a period that is 
poised between the aesthetics of self-mastery and an abstract moralism where the 
concrete bodily individual is nothing and the "soul" everything. However, the interest 
of the period is not in its character as a threshold, a watershed between what came 
before and what comes after, in the continuing story of something called the "self." 
This character of being a threshold or a watershed is not specific to this particular pe-
riod but is rather characteristic of any period inasmuch as it is considered as a pres-
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ent, situated between a past and a future. In other words, any present, considered in 
itself, is a threshold between the past and the future. Rather, the interest of The Care 
of the Self is the particular relation to self it describes : the care and concern for a 
fragile self, one not grounded in unquestioned and unquestionable practices, and yet 
one still constituted in its relations to others. It is this historical (and therefore real) 
possibility that is of interest. 
V. ACTUALIZING POSSIBILITIES 
But what, exactly, is meant by the phrase "historical possibility" ? (Especially if 
we recognize that the point is not to revive and relive the past in any practical sense.) 
The notion of possibility here is contrasted with that of necessity inasmuch as history 
teaches that current practices do not express ahistorical essences or necessary features 
of human "being," but express rather contingent configurations or relations. This in-
cludes those relations in which individuals relate to their selves as selves. The pur-
pose of the type of historical analysis Foucault proposes — the exploration of differ-
ent historical "possibilities" — also serves as the basis for a certain wariness vis-à-vis 
the constitutive functions that make up the relation between the individual and his or 
her self ; a wariness, that is, based on the contingent character of those relations and 
directed to the appearance of necessity, and perhaps more importantly, to the appeal 
to necessity. 
However, the notion of possibility can also be contrasted with the notion of actu-
ality as well. That is, if one recognizes that the actual world is a contingent matter of 
fact, i.e. that it could have turned out differently than it actually has, then one is say-
ing that the actual world is only one possibility amongst many possibilities (or one set 
or configuration of possibilities amongst many). Yet, actuality is not merely one set 
of possibilities amongst others for the simple reason that it is not a mere possibility 
but an actual one. Actuality is, as it were, actualized or real possibility as opposed to 
possibility considered as such.25 This gives actuality or the actual world or the real 
world a kind of distinctiveness and concreteness that merely possible worlds do not 
possess. 
What does this have to do with Foucault's approach to historical possibility ? The 
distinctiveness of the actual world raises the question of why this particular set of 
possibilities was actualized and not some other set. And the question is normally an-
swered by looking to the antecedent conditions which "led up" to this particular set 
of actualized possibilities. This way of answering the question further distinguishes 
actuality from other possibilities because only actuality is tied in a more or less clear 
way to its antecedent conditions whereas mere possibilities remain "open" and un-
connected to anything real. What this does, in effect, is provide the temptation to re-
move actuality from the realm of possibility altogether and place it within the realm 
of necessity. The purpose here, of course, is not to say that actuality or the actual 
25. For the connections between actuality, possibility, and necessity, cf. Hegel's Science of Logic, translated 
by A.V. Miller, Atlantic Highlands, Humanities Press, 1969, the section on "Actuality," p. 541-553. 
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world necessarily, that is, by means of a necessary process, came to be what it in fact 
is ; but that because it is what it is, then it is reasonable to ask why this is so, and to 
do this one is said to go back and ascertain the necessary conditions that permitted 
the actual set of possibilities to be the ones that were, in effect, actualized. Thus, his-
tory becomes the inquiry of what it is in the past that made the present possible, i.e. 
actual, that actualized possibility that it is. 
This is where Foucault comes in. I have noted that Foucault rejects the view of 
history that sees the present as the culmination of the past. Now we can clearly see 
why : this approach has the effect of removing the present from the realm of possi-
bility by giving it the character (and illusion) of necessity. It is true that the present 
can be described as an actualized set of possibilities and it is also true that actualized 
possibilities differ from mere possibilities by the simple fact of their actuality. How-
ever, it is not true that actual or present possibilities are the only real ones. Reality is 
not exhausted by actuality. At least, not if the idea of an "historical reality" maikes 
sense. 
The problem is that the idea of "actualized possibilities" is ambiguous. It could 
refer to possibilities that have been actualized. Or it could refer to possibilities that 
currently are being actualized. Stating things this way, however, clears up matters 
considerably. Possibilities that have been actualized obviously refer to the past ; 
while possibilities that are being actualized clearly refer to the present. Here we see 
the problem with the view of history that sees the present as the culmination of the 
past : in doing so it in effect treats the present as though it were past, i.e. as some-
thing that has been actualized. Thus, its point of departure is not the "real" present — 
a set of possibilities currently being actualized — but an "imaginary" present, one 
that is deemed complete. However, one can only find possibilities that have been ac-
tualized in the sense of "completed" in the past. Possibilities that are currently being 
actualized are being actualized in the various practices that make up the present, in-
cluding of course the practice of historical analysis. 
Foucault's mode of historical analysis — the exploration of historical possibili-
ties — is designed to respond to this ambiguous and complex situation. He analyzes 
historical possibilities that have been actualized — for example, Greek and Roman 
practices of self — in a way that reveals the connections (and disconnections) those 
possibilities have with possibilities that are currently being actualized, i.e. modern 
practices and relations to the self, characterized in terms of relations of power and in 
terms of the repressive hypothesis. However, because there are certain connections 
between the two sets of possibilities (those that have been and those that are being 
actualized) and because the latter are still "open" in the sense of being on-going, 
then, history does not only tell us about the past, but helps, indeed provides the tools 
for restructuring the present, not from scratch, nor from some point outside of it, but 
from within its on-going process. The actualized possibilities of the past, through 
historical analysis, offer perspectives on the possibilities being actualized in the pres-
ent. 
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It is for this reason that the suspicion characteristic of Foucault's approach is not 
gratuitous nor destructive. It is, one might say, a functional characteristic of historical 
analysis, especially if one considers historical analysis as the play between the fa-
miliar and the unfamiliar. We can now also characterize this "play" as expressing the 
two senses of "actualized possibilities" : present configurations are familiar while 
past configurations are unfamiliar on the one hand, and on the other, past possibilities 
can be made intelligible, thus familiar, and can then enable us to see present possi-
bilities from a different perspective, thus rendering them unfamiliar. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
If we are to sum up our discussion, then, what Foucault provides in the last two 
volumes of his History of Sexuality is a response to the present and to our self-
understanding by offering a perspective from which to view them, thereby suggesting 
the possibility of moving beyond them. 
The Use of Pleasure described a possibility of one's relation to oneself as char-
acterized by the triad of freedom-self-mastery-truth that contrasts with the present 
triad freedom-autonomy-truth. Thus while the present is familiar with the idea of the 
self freely related to its own truth, it is not through the mode of self-mastery but 
through the mode of an autonomous relation to the universal. The point of contrasting 
the two is to reveal the possibility of creativity implicit in the mode of self-mastery ; 
creativity, that is, vis-à-vis the codes and rules regulating conduct, and thus of intro-
ducing this possibility of creativity into the open (because currently on-going) possi-
bilities being actualized in the present. 
The Care of the Self for its part, described the possibility of a mode of caring and 
concern for the self — contrasting it the present's "technological" approach to the 
self26 — and thereby introduced the notion of a. fragile self, one in need of constant 
attention. Thus, according to Foucault, if one is to entertain or practice a freely crea-
tive or creatively free relation to one's self as truth, then one should also take care to 
account for the fragility of that self and its truth. At least, this is what Foucault's his-
torical analysis appears to suggest. The exploration of historical possibilities that 
have been actualized are thus turned into possibilities that join those that are cur-
rently being actualized in the present. 
Here we see the positive role of the concept of self-wariness that has been a focus 
of this presentation of Foucault. The wariness it advocates is not only directed to-
wards the imposition of particular selves such that complete identification is attained, 
but is also directed to the protection and sustenance — not of this or that particular 
self — but of the possibility of freely and creatively relating to self. And the only 
guarantee of this possibility, at least within the possibilities currently being actualized 
in the present, is the continuous exploration and analysis of historical possibilities, 
for it is by means of history that one can, through the contrast between the familiar 
26. Cf. E.H. MARTIN et al, Technologies of the Self, Amherst, The University of Massachusetts Press, 1988. 
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and the unfamiliar it offers, dis-connect oneself from one's self and one's present, 
and open up a space for what Foucault has called "the undefined work of freedom."27 
Thus, it is only if the present remains open to the past, both in its understanding 
of it and in its relation to it, that it can guarantee that it will remain open — not to the 
future, the future remains open by definition — but to itself, and to its current possi-
bilities. 
27. M. FOUCAULT, "What is Enlightenment ?," in P. Rabinow, éd., The Foucault Reader, New York, Pan-
theon Books, 1984, p. 46. 
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